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INTRODUCTION: 
Individual accountability is deeply intertwined with the concept of combatting corporate 
misconduct. Bolstering the ability to pursue individual accountability in the context of corporate 
wrongdoing greatly reinforces the public’s trust in both the government and also the particular 
institution or sector. The effects of curbing this level of accountability greatly erodes public trust. 
An example of such erosion occurred in 2008 and began with the bursting of the subprime 
mortgage bubble. 
Following the 2008 financial crisis, no CEO’s went to prison, only one executive served 
prison time, and companies largely just paid penalties.1 Often times, the gains these companies 
made were greater than the penalties they paid for the same conduct. This has caused a 
significant amount of wariness amongst the general public regarding the financial sector. But 
more significantly, this has fostered sentiments of distrust regarding the government and its 
desire to hold executives accountable. A similarly circumstance is occurring now, though not in 
the banking sector, it is taking place within the context of healthcare system. 
In 2015, spurring from the ashes of the financial crisis, Deputy Attorney General Sally 
Yates authored the famed Yates Memorandum2, which set out a policy aspiring to promote 
holding individual members of a corporate entity accountable and re-instilling public trust. The 
summation of this memorandum is that a corporation must cooperate fully to receive any 
cooperation credit during a prosecution.3 In other words, if a company chooses to cooperate, they 
must do so fully, and this includes being cooperative about any wrongdoing its own employees 
 
1 Michael Winston, Why has no CEO ever been punished for the financial crisis?, (Dec. 8, 2016, 6:10 PM), 
https://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/finance/309544-why-have-no-ceos-been-punished-for-the-financial-crisis. 
2 Memorandum for Sally Quillian Yates, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice to All U.S. Att’ys et al., 
Individual Accountability for Corporate Wrongdoing (Sept. 9, 2015) 
https://www.justice.gov/archives/dag/file/769036/download.  
3 Id.  
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committed while at the company. The impetus for this memo arose from the significant amount 
of public mistrust regarding the banking sector, as well as for the Department of Justice (the 
“Department”) itself.4  
Today, the country is faced with an additional crisis, the Opioid Epidemic. This phrase 
describes the ballooning of overdoses, deaths, and hospitalizations arising from the use of opioid 
products occurring in recent years.5 In 2017, HHS declared the Opioid Crisis a public health 
emergency and announced a 5-point plan to combat this epidemic. However, this plan has done 
nothing to address the corporate misconduct and individual accountability that spurred this crisis. 
While a number of pharmaceutical manufacturers are implicated in the commission of this 
crisis,6 virtually no pharmaceutical executives have been held individually accountable for their 
role in perpetuating, and for some executives, manufacturing this crisis.  
This absence of individual accountability is not a result of the Department’s lack of an 
appetite for holding executives accountable, though this may be how the public often perceives 
it. Instead, the lack of accountability is likely a product of the fact that it is difficult for 
prosecutors to overcome the mens rea requirements imposed by the federal statutes addressing 
opioid related misconduct such as the Controlled Substances Act of 1970 (the “CSA”).7 Often 
times, as an alternative, prosecutor will push for lesser administrative sanctions, settlements, or 
attempt to bring charges under the False Claims Act or another statute, to facilitate some type of 
accountability against these entities and associated individuals. Under the CSA, it is very 
 
4 In 2018, Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein put forth a revised version of the Yates memorandum which 
slightly lessened the rigors imposed on companies who wanted to qualify for the cooperation credit. 
5 About the Epidemic, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUM. SERVS., https://www.hhs.gov/opioids/about-the-
epidemic/index.html (September 30, 2020) [hereinafter About the Epidemic].  
6 Jan Hoffman, 6 Drug Companies’ role in Opioid Epidemic Scrutinized by Prosecutors, THE NEW YORK TIMES, 
(Nov. 27, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/27/nyregion/brooklyn-opioid-investigation.html [hereinafter 
“Drug Companies Role in the Opioid Epidemic”] 
7 Joanna R. Lampe, CORPORATE DRUG TRAFFICKING LIABILITY – A NEW LEGAL FRONT IN THE OPIOID CRISIS, 
LSB10307, (2019) [hereinafter Corporate Drug Trafficking Liability]. 
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difficult to prove the requisite intent for pharmaceutical manufacturers by analyzing and 
assessing discoverable documents. The Department has focused more on bringing about 
settlements for wrongdoing by large corporations, as opposed to following through with 
individual prosecutions of executives.8 To prosecute an individual under the CSA, the 
government must show that pharmaceutical executives knowingly violated the applicable 
statute.9 More on this later, but it is important to note that this is a very high bar and is the 
primary reason that more individuals have not been held to account for their role in this crisis.  
This article proposes a reduction in the mens rea requirement for prosecuting 
pharmaceutical executives and individuals under the CSA. A reduction of the mens rea 
component of the CSA from a “willful and intentional” standard to a lesser “recklessness” 
standard would substantially facilitate prosecuting individual executives in the pharmaceutical 
industry and would greatly curb related wrongdoing. 
Part I will provide background information about the opioid epidemic and introduce the 
concept of “diversion.” The main purpose of this section is to provide all of the relevant 
background information necessary to adequately understand the circumstances that necessitate 
this proposal. 
Part II will focus on the CSA, the relevant intent standards, and the difficulties associated 
with prosecuting individual manufacturers under this standard.  
Part III will continue on by highlighting contemporary litigation surrounding the modern-
day opioid epidemic, discussing the relevant entities and their role in the crisis, and identify 
shortfalls and potential obstacles to the aims championed by the government under the CSA.  
 
8 Jesse Eisinger Why Only One Top Banker Went to Jail for the Financial Crisis, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (May 4, 
2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/04/magazine/only-one-top-banker-jail-financial-crisis.html. 
9 Corporate Drug Trafficking Liability, Supra note 7. 
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Part IV will conclude by discussing the proposed change to the law, conducting an 
analysis of this law change, and discussing the potential impact that this change will have to the 
opioid epidemic and public trust as a whole. The aim of this section is to demonstrate how the 
reduction of the intent standard within the CSA will facilitate the accomplishment of the twin 
aims of the CSA while also curbing the appetite by pharmaceutical manufacturers to continue the 
perpetration of this crisis for profit.  
PART I: The Opioid Epidemic and “Diversion”  
The Opioid Epidemic has devastated the country. In 2016, opioid overdose deaths 
reached a peak, killing 42,000 people.10 This was more deaths than any previously recorded 
year.11 The next year it increased to 47,000.12 Of these overdose deaths, approximately forty 
percent directly involved the use of prescription opioids. What makes this more devastating are 
the potential avenues that this misuse can lead to. Approximately eighty percent of individuals 
who use the illegal drug heroin, first misused legally prescribed opioids.13 Around five percent of 
individuals who misuse prescription opioids eventually transition to heroin, a cheaper 
alternative.14  
The origins of this crisis commenced long before 2016. In the late 1990s, opioid 
manufacturers began to convince the medical community that patients could not become 
addicted by taking prescription opioid pain relief medication.15 Doctors then began prescribing 
these medications much more freely than they otherwise would have. The result of this rhetoric 
 




14 Id.  
15 https://www.drugabuse.gov/drugs-abuse/opioids/opioid-overdose-crisis (follow “Drug Abuse” hyperlink; then 
“Opioids” hyperlink; then “Opioid Overdose Crisis” hyperlink) 
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spurred the formation of an environment ripe with misuse and diversion.16 It was these 
manufacturers who helped foster this environment and create this crisis. Companies like Purdue 
L.P., implemented targeted and sometimes deceptive marketing practices to identify physicians 
with high numbers of chronic-pain patients, often highlighting the least discriminate prescribers 
in the process.17 
The evolution of this crisis is marked by three waves of deaths. The first began in the late 
1990’s with the increase of prescribing opioids. The second occurred in 2010 with a rapid 
increase in opioid related overdoses resulting from heroin use. The final wave began in 2013 and 
peaked in 2017, this is marked by the increase in opioid overdose deaths involving synthetic 
opioids like fentanyl.18  
To thoroughly grasp the scope of wrongdoing involved in the opioid crisis, it is 
instructive to delve into the concept of “diversion,” with particular emphasis on how it relates to 
the CSA.  
In 1970, the Congress of the United States of America enacted into the law the CSA.19 
The CSA is the legal foundation for the government’s struggle to curb the abuse of drugs in the 
country.20 This law is a consolidation of various drug laws that existed at the time. The CSA 
requires that manufacturers, distributors, and dispensers of controlled substances, register with 
the DEA. These registrants may not violate the CSA or any of its implementing regulatory 
 
16 Id. 
17 Art Van Zee, The Promotion and Marketing of OxyContin: Commercial Triumph, Public Health Tragedy, AM J 
PUBLIC HEALTH, (Feb. 2019) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2622774/.  
18 Understanding the Epidemic, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL AND PREVENTION, 
https://www.cdc.gov/drugoverdose/epidemic/index.html, (March 19, 2020). 
19 Virgil Van Dusen & Alan R. Spies, An Overview and Update of the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, 
PHARMACY TIMES, (2007) https://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/issue/2007/2007-02/2007-02-6309 
20 Id. 
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framework. Such violations may result in administrative enforcement actions, civil penalties, or 
criminal prosecutions by the Department, as discussed below.  
Diversion occurs when controlled substances transactions take place outside of the closed 
system of distribution established by the Congress.21 Diversion may occur at any point in the 
supply chain for a particular drug.22 Any of the registrants, whether they are manufacturers, 
distributors, physicians, pharmacies, or researchers, have the potential to illegally divert 
opioids.23 The person receiving the drug for medical use is typically not a registrant.24 Any of the 
registrants, whether they are manufacturers, distributors, physicians, pharmacies, or researchers, 
have the potential to illegally divert opioids.25 In 2007, the DEA estimated that prescription drug 
diversion constituted an approximately $25 billion-a-year industry.26 This number has since 
increased.  
Again, it is important to emphasize that the act of diversion may occur at any point within 
the drug supply chain.27 Diversion may occur within a supply chain at the wholesale level of 
manufacturing and distribution and can often include the theft of medication that is in the process 
of transport.28 It may occur at the retail level, often involving the theft of specific drugs by 
employees of medical and pharmacological institutions.29 Additionally, diversion may occur 
through the use of stolen, forged, or misused prescriptions.30 The last and perhaps the most 
 
21 Id.  
22 Laura A. Stokowski, Drug Diversion in the United States, MEDSCAPE, 
https://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/572103 (2008) [hereinafter Drug Diversion in the U.S.]. 
23 Id.  
24 Id. 
25 Id. 
26James A. Inciardi et al., The Diversion of Prescription Opioid Analgesics, LAW ENFORC. EXEC. FORUM, (Sept. 
2014) https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4176900/ [hereinafter “Diversion of Prescription Opioids”]. 
27 Drug Diversion in the U.S., Supra note 22.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. 
30 Id.  
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significant form of diversion occurs at the patient level and through the use of “pill mills” and 
“doctor shopping.” These terms refer to inappropriate prescribing and the seeking if prescription 
medication under false pretense, respectively.31 Often, medical practices that constitute a “pill 
mill” prescribe significantly above average amounts of controlled substances. From a business 
standpoint, these high-volume prescribing “pill mills” could be extremely lucrative to a 
pharmaceutical company, particularly those that are unscrupulous enough to knowingly or 
recklessly market to these doctors.  
The CSA attempts to protect the public from these dangers by curbing the allures of 
catering to these illegitimate institutions making it illegal to knowingly supply them with drugs. 
However, the CSA does not pose enough of a deterrent, nor does it equip the government with 
the adequate tools to pursue and curb this type of diversion. An explanation of the CSA, the 
“knowing” standard under the statute, as well as the tools that the Government has available to 
curb this conduct, is warranted.  
PART II: The Controlled Substances Act, the Associated Intent Standard, the 
Government’s Tools 
 
The CSA statute encompasses two aims: to protect the public from the dangers associated 
with addictive controlled substances being diverted into the marketplace; and to ensure that 
patients may have adequate access to these substances with legitimate medical usage.32  
A violation of the CSA’s recordkeeping provision only requires that the government 
demonstrate negligence. This standard is satisfied when the actor “adverts to the possibility of 
harm, and then acts or fails to act either with the express purpose of achieving the harm, or with 
knowledge that the proscribed harm must inevitably follow his act or omission, however much 
 
31 Id. 
32 Drug Diversion in the U.S., Supra note 22. 
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he may not desire the consequences.”33 However, to find an individual guilty of violating the 
trafficking and manufacturing provisions of the statute, the act must have been done knowingly 
or intentionally.34 The term “knowingly” describes that the individual acted consciously or with 
knowledge or completely understanding of the circumstances surrounding a particular 
situation.35 Additionally, the person is also thought to have satisfied this standard if they are 
“substantially certain” that specific conduct will actualize such a result.36 This applies to a 
conspiracy to violate the CSA as well. This standard serves as a protection from the public 
against prosecutorial overreach. At the same time, it provides a substantial barrier to prosecutors 
attempting to find individual members of a pharmaceutical manufacturing company liable for a 
conspiracy to violate the CSA by diverting opiates.  
The “knowing” or “intentional” mens rea requirement under the statute’s trafficking and 
manufacturing provisions is substantially more difficult for prosecutors to satisfy than the lesser 
“negligence” standard under the recordkeeping provision. This intentional harm standard may 
serve as one of the extreme poles of the spectrum of intent. Negligent conduct found to be 
appropriate to bring forth civil liability under the recordkeeping provision, would be the other 
end of this spectrum.37 
Federal law authorizes the DEA to pursue legal action to prevent the diversion of 
controlled substances and promote the protection of public safety.38 Since 1973, the DEA has 
been the agency responsible with the implementing of regulations relating to the CSA.39 The 
 
33 Edward W. Hautamaki, The Element of Mens Rea in recklessness and “Criminal Negligence”, 68 DUKE L.J. 55, 
56 (2018) [hereinafter “Mens Rea in Recklessness and Negligence”] 
34 Joanna R. Lampe, CONGR. RESEARCH SERV., R45948, THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT (CSA): A LEGAL 




38 Diversion of Prescription Opioids, Supra note 26 
39 Id. 
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DEA is responsible for making certain that controlled substances transactions take place within 
the “closed system.”40  
As allowed by 21 U.S.C. §§ 824(c)(2)(A) and 824(d)(1), the DEA may use administrative 
enforcement actions to revoke, suspend, or deny any registrant from continuing their 
registration.41 Registrants may be issued an Order to Show Cause, in an effort to explain the 
basis for the initiation of the DEA administrative proceedings that could potentially lead to 
sanctions and other adverse actions.42 More significant violations receive a more significant 
response. The DEA may encourage a registrant to voluntarily surrender their license.43 If the 
registrant refuses, the DEA may issue an Immediate Surrender Order against the license of the 
registrant; to successfully implement an Immediate Surrender Order, the DEA must demonstrate 
that there was evidence of “imminent danger to public health or safety.”44 Civil and criminal 
action are reserved for more “extreme cases” with the DEA opting to pursue administrative 
action in the run of cases.45 
Registrants must identify and report suspicious orders to the DEA.46 Under 21 C.F.R. § 
1301.74, suspicious orders constitute orders of “unusual size, orders deviating substantially from 
a normal pattern, and orders of unusual frequency.”47 The trouble is, these suspicious orders are 
often not recorded.48 In fact, a Diversion Program Manager described the system as a “joke,” 
where registrants more often than not, do not report anything unless they were formerly subject 
 
40 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRACTITIONER’S MANUAL: AN INFORMATIONAL OUTLINE OF THE CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCES ACT (2006). 
41 OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GEN. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION’S 









to a Memorandum of Agreement with the DEA for a previous violation of DEA regulations.49 
Under the Code of Federal Regulations, registrants are not required to state why they believe a 
particular order is suspicious, creating an environment where inconsistent standards and 
thresholds are applied to unusual order behavior/50 
A review by the Office of the Inspector General (the “OIG”) in 2019 found that since 
2000, the DEA did not respond with the appropriate haste or zeal required to address the 
diversion of opioids. A Diversion Program Manager expressed to the review that field division 
staff had not received access to the suspicious order database until 2017, approximately one 
decade after it was established.51 In the same review, the OIG found that DEA policies and 
regulations put in place to prevent diversion and hold registrants accountable, generally did not 
adequately do so.52 
Clearly these controls, particularly when coupled with the “knowing and intentional” 
standard, create a system that cannot adequately contend with opioid diversion. These controls 
typically are not taken seriously until the actual entity or individual has been found guilty of 
previous wrongdoing. Additionally, as will be clarified further when discussing current litigation 
surrounding opioid diversion, it is often very difficult to find evidence that clears the high burden 
imposed by this standard. For instances, a review of internal emails and documents surrounding a 
particular instance of diversion alleged to have taken place at an institution, may not definitively 
demonstrate that an individual had actual knowledge of the diversion. At the same time, it is very 







diversion does not exist, the actual diversion, or at least conspiracy to violate the CSA by 
engaging in diversion, may exist. 
What then, would be sufficient to curb diversion to such an extent that the “opioid 
epidemic” would cease to be an “epidemic?” How can the individual registrants be held to 
account with an adequate level of deterrence to dissuade them and their parent entity from 
engaging in or facilitating diversion? The answer to these questions is much simpler than it may 
seem on its face: a reduction of the mens rea or intent standard within the portion of the CSA 
governing opioid diversion for pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
This would adequately hinder the opioid epidemic by holding individual executives 
accountable for the wrongdoing that occurred under their watch. Fear of individual 
accountability would go a long way. Strict liability is a complete lack of a mens rea requirement, 
and therefore, will not be discussed within the mens rea spectrum. “Recklessness” or “reckless 
conduct” falls somewhere in the murky middle of previously discussed spectrum of intent.53 It is 
this standard that we will look to as a way to address the above questions. But first, it is useful to 
further outline the intent standard under the CSA as it presently stands.  
The caselaw surrounding the CSA has helped clarify the high mens rea requirement for 
the statute. McFadden v. United States, a Supreme Court case from 2015, clarified that the CSA, 
which makes it illegal to knowingly manufacture, distribute, or possess with the intent to 
distribute control substances, necessitates that the government must establish the defendant knew 
that the substance being dealt with was a substance regulated under the CSA.54 
In United States v. Feingold, the 9th circuit, additionally clarified this standard by stating 
that a healthcare professional may be guilty of a CSA violation, if the government can 
 
53 Id. 
54 McFadden v. U.S., 576 U.S. 186 (2015).  
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demonstrates that the professional intentionally acted outside the usual course of professional 
practice.55 
Neither of these contours is directly applicable to the context of opioid diversion 
regarding pharmaceutical manufacturers and executives. At the same time, these cases serve to 
demonstrate the centrality of the intentional standard within the CSA. The reason for this is 
because in Anglo-American criminal law, it is a fundamental principle that the so-called criminal 
conduct was done with a level of intent, to be punishable.56 This is to avoid punishing individuals 
who act involuntarily or who act without a so-called “criminal intent.”57  
So-called “reckless conduct” occurs when an individual has: “(1) actual knowledge that a 
course of conduct he is about to embark upon involves a high degree of risk of causing death or 
substantial harm to another, and (2) a conscious decision to risk occurrence of the harm.”58 
Under these conditions, the actor cannot be found to have intended harm, but instead to have 
risked the occurrence of harm.59 Regarding the CSA, this standard would create a higher duty of 
care for executives and pharmaceutical manufacturers. The hope is that these entities, and the 
individuals making the decisions, would take greater care to avoid blatant pill mills and other 
obvious avenues of diversion, even if significant financial incentives to act recklessly exist. It is 
this reckless conduct, rather than specifically delineated conspiracies to violate the CSA, that has 
propelled this crisis.  
 
55 U.S. v. Feingold, 454 F.3d 1001 (9th Cir. 2006). 





Facts about contemporary pharmaceutical manufacturers and the litigation surrounding 
their conduct, will greatly illuminate the statute as it stands and shortcomings stemming from the 
higher intent standard.  
PART III: Contemporary Litigation, Shortfalls, the State of Things 
 The Opioid Epidemic, unsurprisingly, has given rise to a flurry of litigation involving 
prescription drug manufacturers.60 These include marquee companies such as Purdue Pharma 
L.P. and Johnson & Johnson.61 In 2019, more than six big-named pharmaceutical companies 
disclosed in their regulatory filings that they have received grand jury subpoenas from the 
Eastern District of New York in connection with criminal investigations involving opioids.62 
Prosecutors sought to prove whether pharmaceutical companies knowingly allowed opioid 
medications to flood the country.63 
A. Purdue – OxyContin: 
Purdue Pharma L.P., along with its subsidiaries and controlling family (the “Sacklers”), 
are often viewed as the face of the modern-day opioid epidemic.64 The Sacklers, and their 
companies, have received probably the most scrutiny for their contributions to the opioid 
epidemic. The effect of this scrutiny is evident by the flurry of institutions rushing to remove the 
family’s name from their donations.65 One of the main reasons for this scrutiny stems from the 
 
60 Drug Companies Role in the Opioid Epidemic, Supra note 6.  
61 Id. 
62 Id.  
63 Corinne Ramey, Federal Prosecutors Launch Criminal Probe of Opioid Makers, Distributors, THE WALL STREET 
JOURNAL, (Nov. 26, 2019), https://www.wsj.com/articles/federal-prosecutors-launch-criminal-probe-of-opioid-
makers-distributors-11574790494. 
64 Patrick Radden Keefe, The Family that Built an Empire of Pain, THE NEW YORKER, (Oct. 23, 2017), 
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2017/10/30/the-family-that-built-an-empire-of-pain [hereinafter “Empire of 
Pain”]. 
65Lisette Voytko, Louvre Removes Sackler Name, Joining Growing List of Organizations Severing Ties From 
Family, FORBES, (Jul. 17, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/lisettevoytko/2019/07/17/louvre-removes-sackler-
name-joining-growing-list-severing-ties-from-family/#48b76392dce5. 
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fact that Purdue Pharma L.P. is the creator of the drug OxyContin. When discussing Purdue, it is 
important to understand at least a brief history of the company as well as the litigation that has 
surrounded its opiate manufacturing.  
Dr. Arthur Sackler was known as the patriarch of the family and along with his brothers, 
purchased an unknown patent-medicine company called Purdue Frederick in 1952.66 This 
eventually became Purdue Pharma L.P. In 1997, Sackler was posthumously inducted into the 
Medical Advertising Hall of Fame for his work in combining advertising with pharmaceutical 
promotion.67 His so-called “knack” for marketing has been described differently by his peers: 
“Most of the questionable practices that propelled the pharmaceutical industry into the scourge it 
is today can be attributed to Arthur Sackler.”68 These persuasive, and often, deceptive marketing 
practices, are embedded in the DNA of Purdue and somewhat pervasive in the marketing sector 
of the pharmaceutical industry.  
When Arthur Sackler died in 1987, his brothers Raymond and Mortimer successfully 
took control of his stake.69 At the same time, the company engineered its new drug: OxyContin, 
and with it, stepped into unimaginable wealth.  
Raymond’s son, Richard, was centrally involved in the effort to find a new “wonder 
drug” to replace the expiring patent on their drug MS Contin. A memo sent to Richard in 1990 
discussed the MS Contin would soon “face such serious generic competition that other 
controlled-release opioids must be considered.”70 The memo continued on by discussing efforts 
to create a product that contained a drug developed by German scientists, known as oxycodone.71 
 







At the same time, internal emails and other documentation showed the company’s push to launch 
the drug, and its plan for targeting the drug to non-cancer patients with chronic pain.72 Board 
minutes following the 1995 approval of the drug by the FDA, reflect this notion, stating that the 
firm did “not want to niche OxyContin just for cancer pain.”73  
The Sackler connection to OxyContin has remained obscure as a result of the fact that 
Purdue is not a publicly traded company, so disclosures to shareholders are not necessary.74 
Though it is alleged that throughout the existence of OxyContin, the money from the sale of this 
drug has flowed from the company directly to the various branches of the Sackler family.75 
In 2003, the U.S. General Accounting Office (“GAO”) conducted a study to determine: 
“(1) how OxyContin was marketed and promoted, (2) what factors contributed to the abuse and 
diversion of OxyContin, and (3) what actions have been taken to address OxyContin abuse and 
diversion.”76  
It found that by 2003, nearly 50% of all OxyContin prescribers were primary care 
physicians.77 The DEA expressed concerns that “Purdue’s aggressive marketing of OxyContin 
focused on promoting the drug to treat a wide range of conditions to physicians who may not 
have been adequately trained in pain management.”78 
The study then cites three primary reasons for the prolific rise of OxyContin use, abuse, 
and diversion. First, the notion that the drug is available in doses twice as potent as morphine, 
 





76U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-110, OXYCONTIN ABUSE AND DIVERSION AND EFFORTS TO 




making it attractive for misuse and diversion.79 Second, the original warning label describes 
methods that patients should not use when ingesting the drug.80 In doing so, the firm explicitly 
lays out methods for ingesting the drug in a manner that would bypass time-release protocols and 
enable an rapid release of OxyContin into the system. Finally, it points to the significant increase 
in availability of the drug and posits that this likely increased opportunities for abuse and 
diversion.81  
There have been hundreds of lawsuits against Purdue since the release of OxyContin.82 In 
a 2002 suit, discovery demonstrated through thousands of documents that the company was 
perpetrating a fraud against the entire medical community.83 These documents shed light on the 
notion that assertions about the drug safety came straight from marketing, and not the scientific 
department. Within the first five years of its existence, OxyContin was generating one billion 
dollars each year.84 Some sales representatives were earning hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
yearly commissions, tied directly to their pushing and sale of OxyContin to physicians. Internal 
memoranda from 2001 describe the company’s sale force as the “most valuable resource” that it 
possessed.85  
Purdue plead guilty to criminal misbranding in a case brought by Virginia federal 
prosecutors.86 In the plea, the firm noted that they had marketed OxyContin with the intent to 
“defraud or mislead.”87 Despite Richard Sackler’s leadership role at the firm, he was not charged 
 
79 Id. 
80 Id.  
81 Id. 








with any crimes. Some executives received probation, and collectively, they paid approximately 
thirty-five million dollars in fines.88 The firm itself consented to pay an additional six-hundred 
million dollars.89 Senator Arlen Specter, a Republican from Pennsylvania, is quoted as 
characterizing these fines as an, “expensive license for criminal misconduct.”90  
The Sackler family is credited by some as de-stigmatizing opioids and creating a climate 
that allowed for other pharmaceuticals to capitalize and begin marketing their own opiates and 
opioid related products.91 
In 2015, Purdue settled a case in Kentucky for twenty-four million dollars.92 The firm 
admitted no liability and was able to keep from the public Richard Sackler’s own deposition and 
internal documents obtained through discovery.93 Purdue has been known to claim that they 
never lost this or any other case.94 However, it is more accurate to say that they have never lost a 
trial because they seemingly always settle. This has kept much of its internal documents out of 
the scrutiny of the public theater.  
Following a significant outcry, Richard Sackler stepped down as the president of Purdue 
Pharma L.P. in 2003.95 However, he remained co-chair on the company’s board of directors.96  
It is alleged that the marketing and sales teams for the company implemented their I.M.S. 




90 Empire of Pain, Supra note 64. 
91 Id. 
92 Bill Estep, OxyContin maker to pay state $24 million to settle claim it marketed powerful painkiller improperly, 
LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (De. 23, 2015), https://www.kentucky.com/news/state/article51291770.html. 






also supposedly offered free samples of their product to customers.98 At the induction of 
OxyContin, the company created a program that sought to encourage doctors to issue coupons 
for free OxyContin prescriptions, effectively hooking individuals to their product for free.99 
These allegations, if true, can be analogized to a street-level drug dealer giving their customers 
“their first taste” free of charge. When the program was finally discontinued, customers had 
redeemed nearly thirty-four thousand coupons.100 What is perhaps most troubling is the fact that 
in 2015, Purdue received FDA approval to market the drug to children above the age of ten.101  
Purdue has consistently rallied against any efforts at regulation against their practices, 
often harping on the notion that patients in pain will not be able to be treated without the benefits 
of OxyContin.102 This is Purdue using one of the aims of the CSA to deflect the constraints of 
regulation. From 2006 through 2015, Purdue and a number of other opioid manufacturers spent 
almost one billion dollars on lobby efforts and political contributions to fight against any 
legislation that would curtail their sales.103 To put this number into context, this is roughly eight 
times the amount spent by the firearms lobby during the same period.104 
In 2017, Forbes estimated that the Sackler family continued to receive approximately 
seven hundred million a year from their companies’ profits.105 Purdue has established a 
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and flood the globe with OxyContin. In 2014, a Mundipharma executive is quoted as saying: 
“Every single patient that is in emerging markets should have access to our medicines.”106  
 On September 15, 2019, Purdue agreed to a framework for settling the various United 
States opioid actions it is facing.107 These actions involve twenty-four state attorneys general and 
various offices from five United States territories.108 Five elements comprise the settlement, 
which also comes in tandem with the company declaring bankruptcy in an effort to mitigate 
financial judgments against them:  
 First, the owners of Purdue must contribute all of its assets to a trust or other entity 
established for the benefit of claimants and the American people.109 
 Second, Purdue is allowed to dissolve and reformulate as a new company, being 
governed by an entirely new board of directors selected by the claimants and subject to the 
approval of the Bankruptcy Court.110  
 Third, the new company will contribute tens of millions of doses of opioid overdose 
reversal and medication for addiction treatment, at reduced or no cost.111 
 Fourth, the new company must agree to be bound by injunctive relief, including 
restrictions on its sale and marketing of opioids.112 
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 Last, in addition to the one hundred percent contribution of assets by Purdue, the Sackler 
families must contribute at least three billion dollars, with the potential for additional monetary 
contributes from the sales of their out-of-country pharmaceutical businesses.113 
 During the settlement process, New York’s attorney general’s office has discovered that 
members of the Sackler family have secretly transferred approximately one billion dollars in 
funds to Swiss bank accounts that the they control.114 The state’s attorney general was quoted as 
stating: “Records from one financial institution alone have shown approximately $1 billion in 
wire transfers between the Sacklers, entities they control, and different financial institutions, 
including those that have funneled funds into Swiss bank accounts.”115 The family has an 
estimated worth of approximately thirteen billion dollars.116 Though, various state attorneys 
general find it likely that the family has substantially more wealth shielded from the public. 
While this litigation is still ongoing, it seems likely that the Sackler family will be able to 
continue to escape individual criminal wrongdoing, while rebranding their company, and making 
off with hundreds of millions, if not, billions in gains. They are not even prohibited from 
continuing the sale of opiates.  
B. Insys Therapeutics:  
In 2017, Insys Therapeutics former CEO and founder John Kapoor was indicted on 
charges that he provided kickbacks to physicians for prescribing the company’s potent synthetic 
opiate: fentanyl opioid Subsys.117 Two regional sales directors and a VP were also implicated in 
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this wrongdoing.118 In the indictment, these individuals were alleged, with others at Insys, to 
have bribed doctors to write higher prescriptions of their drug, despite the fact that their drug was 
meant only for the treatment of cancer patients with severe pain119. Additionally, it is alleged that 
Kapoor with his associated, conspired to manipulate and mislead insurance companies in an 
effort to have Subsys covered when prescribed to those who do not have cancer. Kapoor was 
found guilty on charges of conspiracy to commit racketeering and was convicted along with his 
associates, on related charges.120 
Following this conviction, the district court judge partially overturned the executive’s 
convictions for conspiring to illicitly distribute a controlled substance, in violation of the CSA.121 
In her ruling, the Judge explained that the evidence gathered by prosecutors and presented at trial 
was not supporting of the jury’s finding that the executives, “meant to persuade providers to 
prescribe Subsys to patients for which the drug was not intended.”122 Though, the judge 
continued by harping on the notion that the evidence, “could be readily understood as proving 
that the defendants did not care whether patients needed the drug, that still is not enough to prove 
the requisite intent.”123 She then chastises the government for not pursuing bribery or kickback 
charges, which she apparently believed could have been more readily demonstrated by the 
evidence. Clearly the mens rea standard was crucial to the overturned CSA conviction. It is 
significant that while the judge partially overturned the conviction, the jury found them guilty for 
violations of the CSA based on the factual evidence.124  
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Two important distinctions must be discussed in the context of this prosecution. First, the 
notion that prosecutors should have pursued individual accountability via another statute outside 
of the CSA, because there existed much clearer evidence for bribery and kickbacks. And second, 
it is important to note that this company is significantly smaller than other opioid manufacturer’s 
like Purdue Pharma L.P. 
Based on the judge’s remarks regarding the available evidence, it clear that an easier case 
could have been made for bribery and kickback violations. At the same time, a reckless level of 
intent regarding the diversion of opiates was exhibited by the executives. At the ended of the 
day, opiates were misused in the same or a similar fashion as they would have been abused had 
the executives acted in an intentional manner, rather than merely a reckless one. Opiates were 
diverted and prescribed to individuals who did not have a legitimately need for these drugs. The 
recklessness of these actions is not disputed by the jury who found them guilty of conspiring to 
violate the CSA, it is not disputed by the judge who overturned that portion of the conviction 
based entirely on this recklessness, and it is not disputed by the prosecution who brought the 
case. United States Attorney Andrew L. Lelling, the prosecutor heading this investigation, 
discussed this reckless conduct and his desire to pursue executives acting in a reckless manner 
concerning opiate diversion: “Just as we would street-level drug dealers, we will hold 
pharmaceutical executives responsible for fueling the opioid epidemic by recklessly and illegally 
distributing these drugs, especially while conspiring to commit racketeering along the way.”125  
This quote and the tack the prosecution took regarding Insys, demonstrates a willingness 
by the federal government to hold these individuals accountable. At the same time, the ruling 
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highlights the shortcoming of the available tools prosecutors can use to curb the opioid epidemic 
and provide accountability for this conduct. As it stands, if a company did not engage in bribes, 
kickbacks, or other federal violations, but then acted in a reckless manner, causing controlled 
substances to be diverted in the process, they cannot be prosecuted or held accountable in 
anyway.  
The prosecution demonstrated a willingness to hold these Insys executives accountable 
for their conduct. However, it is unclear if a similar appetite exists with regards to taking on 
much larger companies who have intentionally or recklessly diverted opioids.  
C. Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals: 
Mallinckrodt Pharmaceuticals is a large, multibillion-dollar specialty pharmaceutical 
company that manufacturers a large variety of different name-brand and generic drugs.126 
Amongst these drugs are various opioid pain medications and opioid addiction treatment 
medications.127 The company is the largest generic opioid manufacturer in the United States128.  
On April 21, 2020, the state of New York charged Mallinckrodt Plc in a civil action, with 
misrepresenting the effects and dangers of their opioid drug Oxycodone Hydrochloride, thereby 
committing insurance fraud.129 Allegedly, the company exaggerated the benefits of a long-term 
opiate, while minimizing the potential addiction and abuse risks of the product. The state alleges 
that this was all done while knowing that the conduct would lead to fraudulent insurance claims 
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as a result of unnecessary payments.130 This action is part of a regulatory probe by the state into 
entities that are suspected of contributing to the opioid crisis.131 
It is important to note that this, as well as the other above actions, are on-going. None of 
the allegations should be considered true until substantiated by evidence and proven in court. 
That being said, these allegations, if proven true, point to a culture of deceit aimed at 
manipulating the public, the government, and society at large, in an effort to boost sales. It would 
be hard to believe that such widespread misconduct could occur within a pharmaceutical 
company without the knowledge, or at least, reckless disregard, of some executives. However, as 
of now, no executive has been implicated in this manner.  
The government has taken up this action in the wake of a February 25, 2020 agreement 
by the company to pay approximately $1.6 billion to settle a significant number of lawsuits by 
states and local governments with regard to allegations that it helped perpetuate the opioid 
epidemic.132 The agreement also mandates the company’s generic drug business go into 
bankruptcy, at the same time, the company is still allowed to manufacture and distribute 
opiates.133 The government has sought civil penalties rather than criminally charging individual 
executives. While more knowledge of the matter must come-to-light, it may be inferred that this 
decision to pursue civil charges against the company as a whole, criminal charges for 
individuals, may be a result of the ease with which the former may be achieved when compared 
to the latter. At the same time, a compelling case could be made that that holding these 
executives accountable would provide significant deterrence for the next executives attempting 







These examples demonstrate, or at least allege, some of the most egregious conduct 
undertaken by pharmaceutical companies and their executives in an effort to bolster profits. 
Additionally, they also demonstrate the barriers presented to prosecutors attempting to hold these 
individuals accountable for their own wrongdoing.  
PART IV: Proposed Change to the Law and its Effects 
 
The response to the Opioid Crisis has been insufficient. While strides have been made to 
assess the scope of the crisis and care for the individuals directly affected, little has been done to 
curb the environment that has fostered this crisis. Look no further than the HHS 5-point plan to 
understand that a comprehensive approach towards curtailing this issue is not being sought. Only 
a reduction of the mens rea component of the CSA from a “willful and intentional” standard to a 
less rigorous “recklessness” standard would substantially facilitate prosecuting individuals to 
such an extent that it would curb this environment of abuse.  
In April 2017, Secretary Thomas Price announced the Department of Health and Human 
Services’ 5-point strategy for combating the opioid crisis.134 This strategy sought to improve 
access to treatment and recovery services, promote the use of overdose-reversing drugs, 
strengthening the government’s understanding of the epidemic through better public health 
surveillance, providing supporting for pain management and addiction research, and advancing 
better practices for pain management in general.135 These aims focused primarily on contending 
with members of the public who are already dependent on opiates while bolstering the 
government’s understanding of the nature, scope, and effect of this crisis. None of the facets of 
this plan sought to ramp up enforcement against or curb misuse and diversion by registrants. Nor 
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do they seek to apply any sort of consequences for individual manufacturers, particularly those 
with a hand in the opioid crisis.  
It is important to note that while this plan is inadequate with regard to addressing 
underlying causes of the crisis, it serves as a necessary prophylactic regarding society’s ability to 
contend with the corrosive effects of this crisis. It is significant for the government to vie with 
these other facets of this epidemic. However, without an adequately robust response, not just to 
the effects of the crisis, but the underlying cause, it will likely never be sufficiently addressed. 
Additional examples of government initiatives attempting to contend with this crisis are similarly 
inadequate. Often, they are framed in such a way that they can be touted as a success. However, 
the actual effect of these initiatives falls short of what is necessary to sufficiently mitigate this 
crisis.  
On October 25, 2018, the Department of Justice announced the formation of the 
Appalachian Regional Prescription Opioid Strike Force (“ARPO”).136 This strike force consists 
of a joint partnership between nine U.S. Attorney’s Offices within five states.137 Additionally, it 
encompasses the knowledge and resources of the FBI, U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services Office of the Inspector General, and the DEA.138 The goal of this strike force is to 
investigate and dismantle fraud schemes related to health care within the Appalachian region, 
with a particular emphasis on prosecuting medical professionals and “others involved in the 
illegal prescription and distribution of opioids.”139 
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In April 2019, the Department announced that its ARPO Strike Force charged sixty 
defendants from eleven different districts for their alleged role in various diversion and health 
care fraud schemes.140 None of these individuals include drug manufacturers or executives, 
instead the group is comprised of approximately thirty-one doctors and various pharmacists, 
nurse practitioners, and other medical professionals.141 In a press release, Attorney General 
William Barr stated that the crisis, “is the deadliest drug crisis in American history.”142 This must 
mean, that in his opinion, this crisis is more deadly than the crack epidemic in the 1980’s, and 
presumably, warrants at least a reciprocal, if not greater response. HHS Secretary Alex Azar 
harps on the goal for this initiative, stating that the reduction of the “illicit supply of opioids is a 
crucial element of President Trump’s plan to end this public health crisis.”143  Finally, Barr gives 
credit to the department for “doing its part” to put an end to the crisis.  
This release hypes charges brought against thirty-one doctors as if its effect shares some 
type of equivalence with taking down a company like Purdue or Mallinckrodt. It then alludes to 
the significance of reducing the supply of illicit opioids. And finally, discusses the notion that the 
Federal Government is doing its part.  
It seems that the Federal Government needs to be doing more than just “its part” if it is 
legitimately seeking to bring about an end to this crisis, which, in its own words, is “the deadliest 
drug crisis in American history.” Unfortunately, it seems that this Strike Force and the Federal 
Government’s response is inadequate. To a skeptical mind, it may seem like nothing but a 
political maneuver. Touting the disruption of a relatively small number of medical professionals 
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who have taken part in illegal prescribing in a specific region of the country, is a far cry from 
affecting a sufficient reduction in the illicit supply of opioids nationwide. One significant way 
the government may bring about this supposed objective is by prosecuting the manufacturers and 
registrants who have allowed for this environment to flourish into a crisis. Until this occurs, true 
accountability cannot be obtained.  
 The allegations against Purdue Pharma L.P., if true, are an excellent demonstration of the 
lack of consequences for individuals, particularly those who have helped create this crisis. 
Throughout the years the Sackler family has been directly involved with the sale and promotion 
of this drug. However, they have received little or no accountability. Only now, when public 
sentiment surrounding this epidemic has hit a fever pitch, is anything remotely resembling 
individual accountability being sought. The Sacklers have been able to limit discovery and use 
bankruptcy and out-of-court settlements to their advantage to restrict the information about their 
own individual wrongdoing. At the same time, they are allowed to re-brand and continue to sell 
the drug, while still holding hundreds of millions, if not billions, in offshore money and assets. 
The price they paid for their role in this crisis is billons of the company’s money, a fraction of 
their own money, and their board seats. That is all. The only lesson that can be taken from the 
conduct of the Sackler’s and the government’s response is that crime pays.  
 A reduction of the mens rea standard to a recklessness standard would have greatly 
facilitated prosecutors seeking to hold the Sackler’s proverbial feet to the fire. Most notably, the 
Sackler conduct has been characterize as lacking any semblance of remorse or individual 
responsibility. Based on what has been proven, coupled with the swirl of allegations, it’s likely 
that this company has been allowed to use misinformation, lobbying, legal tactics, and financial 
trickery to engineer a crisis, profit of the crisis, and effectively ride off into the sunset. All while 
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placing the blame squarely on the population they have targeted with their drugs. Perversely, the 
company has tried to defend itself from accountability and regulation by using one of the aims of 
the CSA as a shield: the notion that patients with pain cannot receive access to their medication 
without Purdue. It is in fact the opposite, this company has directly caused pain for thousands , if 
not millions of people across the globe.  
 The federal government often seeks settlements with regard to resolving disputes with 
large entities. While the Purdue settlement is a particularly large one, it pales in comparison to 
the damage the company has done, the gains the family has received, and the overall wrongdoing 
committed. Charging the individual executives of Purdue in a similar manner that members of an 
international drug cartel would be charged, could not only increase the potential settlement 
amount received, but would send a strong message to the other manufacturers that if they act in a 
manner similar to a cartel, they will be treated in a manner similar to a cartel. This is the type of 
action that is necessary to combat future instances of this wrongdoing. Otherwise, this is 
tantamount to giving pharmaceutical companies an “expensive license for criminal conduct.”144 
This is particularly egregious when the conduct is so widespread, with far reaching 
consequences. A lack of an adequate response to this extreme conduct will only serve to further 
reduce public sentiment regarding the Department and create a greater dissatisfaction with the 
healthcare sector as a whole.  
 The judge who ruled on Kapoor and Insys specifically cited the recklessness of Kapoor 
and his executives, stating that they likely did not care if the patients needed the drug. Profits 
were their key motivation. Simultaneously, she expressly mentioned that the government was 
unable to satisfy the intent standard to prove a conspiracy to violate the CSA.145 It is not atypical 
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for prosecutors to seek charges for more readily provable crimes, though greater wrongdoing 
may exist. At the same time, it is not just to charge an individual with an anti-kickback statute 
violation, or bribery, just because it is more difficult to prove a drug conspiracy based on state of 
the evidence, when the facts demonstrate that a drug conspiracy occurred. It is clear that in Insys, 
a conspiracy existed. Whether or not the individuals involved intended for the specific 
conspiracy to occur, or whether they were indifferent to its probably occurrence, should not be 
the sole factor that prosecutors consider when deciding whether or not to bring charges. 
Discovery hurdles should not halt the government’s response to a company that is clearly 
conspiring to violate the CSA.  
 Intent is often the guiding principal here. Certain violations, though they may factually 
have occurred, are not done with the full knowledge of the individuals. Prosecutors are able to 
consider the specific case and make a recommendation as to whether or not charges should be 
brought. Based on this, a reduction of the mens rea standard will not lead to an increase in 
frivolous or unnecessary prosecutions. Quite the contrary, it will facilitate the government’s 
enforcement of this crisis. Companies acting recklessly who the government may determine do 
not deserve criminal prosecution rising to the level of a cartel, may have other, lesser charges 
brought against them. But it is of paramount importance the government is bestowed with the 
tools to prosecute these individuals. This is not a proposal that seeks to reduce the mens rea 
component for all crimes, or for all violations of the CSA. Instead, it seeks to specifically target 
CSA violations in the context of healthcare, to further promote trust in the government and the 
sector, while curtailing future potential epidemics and violations.  
 The twin aims of the CSA, promoting access to medication for patients who need it, 
while shielding the country from diversion, are both met and will continue to proliferate with this 
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change in the law. It is clear that this change will serve as a greater deterrent to diversion. If this 
deterrent was not necessary, this crisis would not exist. Issues surrounding the access of pain 
management medications are minimal if they exist at all. The country is flooded with these 
drugs. Overprescribing of all manners of opiates, in all shapes, sizes, and strengths, has occurred 
and continues to occur each day. It is important that individuals are able to continue to receive 
these medications, but in a manner sufficient to address their particular condition and needs. Not 
in such a way that gets them “hooked” and will lead to a lifetime of dependency issues or issues 
with other, more serious or unregulated drugs.  
It is imperative that the government adopts a reduction in the mens rea component of the 
CSA if its goal is to bring about accountability for those who engineered this crisis. Taking these 
matters seriously and prosecuting the individuals for the full extent of the wrongdoing that 
occurred will restore trust to the public while setting an example for future registrants who may 
seek to engage in similar behavior in the name of profits. At the same time, it is recommended 
that the CSA intent standard be reduced to a “recklessness” standard, rather than a negligence 
standard that would be more applicable towards tortious violations. Additionally, to prevent the 
overzealous pursuit of all drug violations, it is suggested that this reduction in mens rea is only 
applicable to conduct undertaken by healthcare professionals or pharmaceutical manufacturers 
who are registrants with the DEA, or who act on behalf of registrants. This should not apply to 
individual civilians who have not been registered with the DEA. 
 
CONCLUSION: 
 The scope of this crisis is grand. Therefore, tremendous action must undertaken to 
sufficiently address these issues. Declaring this epidemic a crisis, and attempting to contend with 
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it through the HHS’s 5-point plan is a strong start. A similar case can be made regarding the 
Department of Justice’s implementation of strike forces like ARPO. However, it is insufficient to 
ensure that this crisis will not continue. Executives will continue to cut corners in the name of 
profits, regardless of the effect on public health, unless a serious threat of individual 
accountability exists. A reduction of the mens rea component of the CSA from a “willful and 
intentional” standard to a lesser “recklessness” standard would substantially facilitate 
prosecuting individual executives in the pharmaceutical industry and would help curb the 
rampant and widespread diversion of opiates occurring in the pharmaceutical sector.  
 
 
 
 
